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Abstract 
Studies abound on market structures for audit services in developed economies of the USA, UK, Canada and 
Australia with abysmal very few on the African continent. Across these studies is the continuous trend of 
exclusion of the financial sector. This study seeks to provide empirical examination of client attributes which 
significantly explain variations in the amount of external audit fees charged by bank auditors in Nigeria. A 
standard audit fee model, modified accordingly, is used to investigate the specific effect of bank size, risks and 
complexities on audit fees for top ten (10) publicly quoted commercial banks, which constitute over 70% of the 
total assets of the industry. Multiple OLS regression was adopted as the estimation technique on the panel data 
gathered through content analysis of annual reports and accounts of these banks over a 4-year post consolidation 
periods covering 2009-2012. The findings from this study reveal that bank size is also an important factor that is 
priced by bank auditors having shown a positive and significant influence accounting for 63% variations. Risk 
proxied by capital adequacy and non performing loans ratios was insignificant but positive and negative 
respectively; while only the number of branches used to operationalise complexities associated with bank audit 
displayed a negative and significant influence. The massive deployment of Information Technology (IT) in the 
industry, especially for the rendering of returns by branches of these banks to their head offices could account for 
this result.       
Keywords: Audit fees, External audit, Banking sector, Nigeria. 
 
1. Introduction 
Audit as defined by the American Accounting Association, AAA (1973) is a ‘systematic process of objectively 
obtaining and evaluating evidence regarding assertions about economic actions and events to ascertain the 
degree of correspondence between the assertions and established criteria and communicating the results to 
interested users’. It serves a vital economic purpose and plays an important role in serving the public interest to 
strengthen accountability and reinforce trust and confidence in financial information and reporting. Annual audit 
is compulsory for companies, including banks in Nigeria. However, in recent years, and in the light of massive 
corporate scandals, there is ongoing global demand for improvements in audit quality. The principal-agent 
conflict depicted in agency theory, where principals lack reasons to trust their agents because of information 
asymmetries and differing motives, is critical to understanding the development of the audit over the centuries as 
well as its usefulness and purpose (Institute of Chartered Accountants of English and Wales, ICAEW, 2007).  
An agency relationship arises when one or more principals (e.g. an owner) engage another person as their agent 
(or steward) to perform a service on their behalf. Performance of this service results in the delegation of some 
decision-making authority to the agent. Auditors are agents of the shareholders whose interests are considered 
different to those of the managers of the companies audited (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). No doubt, information 
asymmetry is a direct consequent of audit. As reported, the concept of information asymmetry emerged from the 
studies of three very important economic researchers (Akerlof (1970), Spence (1976) and Stigliz, (1979)), thus 
they have made the economic theory evolve establishing the basis for modern economic theory (Riley, 2001 in 
Ivan (2011)). Ng (1978) appreciates that the external auditors have two main functions complementing the 
reduction of the information asymmetry: they detect the eventual non-compliance to the accounting regulations 
and limit the discretionary accounting practices of the managers. Relying on this theory, Watts & Zimmermann 
(1986) appreciate that an audit is efficient, when an auditor is competent and independent. One of the main 
characteristics of the auditor’s independence is a correct audit fee for the service which is determined ahead of 
the commencement of the engagement.   
Although not clearly defined in any of the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs), the Nigerian Auditing 
Standards (NSAs), the IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants and the ICAN Scale of Professional 
Fees, the aspects regarding audit fees are extensively analyzed from the point of view of their effects on auditor’s 
independence.  The audit fees can thus be simply described as the sums payable/paid to the auditor, for the audit 
services offered to the auditee (client). According to Simunic (1980), it is a reflection of economic cost of 
efficient auditors. In line with this, the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants establishes that ‘when 
entering into negotiations regarding professional services, a professional accountant in public practice may quote 
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whatever fee that is deemed appropriate’. Similarly, the ICAN’s Scale of Professional Fees while indicating that 
practitioners charge ridiculously inappropriate audit fees also affirm that a reasonably remunerated firm should 
deliver first class service for the needs of private sector clients, public sector clients, regulatory authorities and 
the general public.    
There is a growing trend concerning the nature of audit market and what is an appropriate audit fees and how do 
auditors determine such which is charged and is required to be paid or payable by the auditee. The methodology 
for arriving at an appropriate audit fee is still on-going, especially in the developing economies where researches 
in this area are still very scanty. More specific to this study is the continuous exclusion of the financial sector, 
including banks, in most of the studies on the market and cost determination for audit services (Fields et al, 
2004). This paper, no doubt, serves to contribute to this contemporary issue, thereby reducing the dearth of 
studies in this area, especially, in emerging economy like Nigeria. The rest of this paper is structured as follows: 
section II provides a copious review of relevant literatures and empirical studies as well; this is followed by 
section III which describes the material and methods adopted in this study; while section IV presents the results 
of the analyses and discusses same, the concluding remarks is the focus of section V.   
 
2. Literature Review 
This section presents a review of related works relevant to this paper. The review is carried out commencing 
with studies conducted on developed economies, followed by those ones conducted on developing economies. 
2.1 Developed Economies  
Commencing with the pioneer seminar work of Simunic (1980), there has been copious studies investigating the 
determinants of audit fees in several developed countries. He developed the basic model to explain the 
relationship between the amounts paid by clients to their auditors. Thereafter, similar studies which either tend to 
either buttress or extend Simunic’s work have been undertaken and also adopting this model, though with 
modifications, before application to the varying settings. Among these countries are in the United Kingdom 
(Taylor and Baker, 1981; Taffler and Ramalinggam, 1982; Chan et al. 1993; Pong and Whittington 1994; in 
USA (Francis and Simon, 1987; Palmrose, 1986), in Canada (Chung and Lindsay, 1988; Anderson and Zeghal, 
1994), in New Zealand (Firth, 1985; Johnson, Walker & Westergaard, 1995), in Australia (Francis, 1984; Francis 
and Stokes, 1986; Jubb et al. 1996; Craswell and Francis, 1999) and in Japan (Taylor, 1997). 
Overall, factors which has since been deployed by these varying studies to explain audit fees are categorized into 
client attributes (major ones are size, complexity and risk with internal audit, corporate governance, profitability, 
etc as emerging), auditor attributes (big 4, specialization, tenure, location, etc) and the engagement attributes 
(audit opinion, non-audit services and busy seasons). This paper focuses on the major client characteristics of 
size, complexity and risk as they have been widely reported to show strong explanatory power in explaining 
audit fees across samples (DeFond et al. 2000). For easy articulation of thought, brevity and clarity, selected 
previous works related to developed countries alongside their authors, year and major findings are tabulated 
below: 
Table 1a: Selected previous studies on determinants of audit fees in the developed economies  
Country Author  Industry-type Size Risk Complexity 
UK Taylor, et al (1981) Non-financial Sig. n/a Sig. 
New Zealand Johnson, et al (1995) Non- financial Sig. Sig. Sig. 
New Zealand Firth (1985) Non- financial Sig Sig. Insig. 
Canada Anderson & Zeghal 
(1994) 
Non- financial Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Netherlands Langendijk (1997) Non- financial Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Ireland Simon & Taylor (2002) Financial & non-
financial 
Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Source: Firer and Swartz (2007) modified slightly by the authors 
n/a= not associated 
Beside the tabulated studies shown above, there are other relevant works, conducted in the developed countries 
as well, that are also worth reviewing alongside their major findings. Among the client attributes, no doubt, the 
size of the auditee has been the most predominant and statistically significant variable in determining audit fees 
charged to entities and also permeate industries (see Wilson, (2003), Chung and Narasimhan et al. (2002), 
Carson et al. (2004), Cameran (2005), etc, financial (Fields et al. (2004) and Swanson (2008)) or otherwise. 
There appears to be a large consensus in this area.        
Auditee risk is another factor that is considered with different variables used to proxy it. These among others 
include audit gearing ratios (Sandra et al. 1996) and opinion type (Davis et al. 1993). However, noting the 
peculiar nature of the financial sector, Fields et al. (2004) adopted losses, efficiency ratios, non-performing loans 
ratios, capital adequacy ratio and interest rate risk to measure 277 financial institutions firm risk, operating risk, 
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credit risk, capital risk and market risk respectively reporting significant and positive influence on the audit fees 
with the exception of losses that is insignificant.  
Yet another major determinant is the complexities of the auditee (Davis et al., 1993). The total number of 
consolidated subsidiaries and/or branches (Francis et al. 1986; Wilson, 2003; Ezzamel et al. 2002), the ratio of 
receivables and/ or inventories to the total assets (Firth, 1985; Simon et al. 2002), audit fee diversification (Chan 
et al. 1993) are few measures that were adopted in previous studies. In most of these studies, they were seen to 
have exhibited positive and significant relationship while a few have also been reported to have been 
insignificant (Firth, 1997).            
2.2 Developing Economies 
To date, there have been very few studies on the determinants of audit fees in developing economies. Early 
works in this area are in countries like India: Simon et al. (1986); Singapore: Low et al. (1990); South Africa: 
Simon (1995); Bangladesh: Karim and Mozier (1996); South Korea: Taylor et al. (1999); and Bahrain: Joshi et 
al. (2000); With recent empirical studies in Qatar: Kutob et al. (2004);  South Africa: Firer and Swartz (2007); 
Jordan: Naser et al. (2007); Kuwait: Shammari (2008) and Nigeria: Akinpelu et al. (2013).      
Similar to what is done above the selected studies in developing economies alongside their major findings are 
also tabulated below. 
Table 1b: Selected previous studies on determinants of audit fees in developing economies 
Country Author  Industry-type Size Risk Complexity 
South Africa Simon (1995) Non-financial Sig. Sig. Sig. 
South Africa Firer, et al (2007) Financial & 
non-financial 
Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Kuwait Shammari,et al (2008) Non-financial Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Bangladesh Karim et al (1996) Non-financial Sig. n/a Sig. 
Bahrain Joshi et al (2000) Non-financial Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Singapore Low et al (1990) Non-financial Sig. Insig Sig. 
Hong Kong/ 
Malaysia/ 
Singapore 
Simon et al (1992) Non-financial Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Source: Firer and Swartz (2007) modified slightly by the authors 
Findings from table 1b above shows no clear departure from what obtain in the developed countries with respect 
to size, risk and complexity in determining variations in audit fees. Mohd et al. (2000) and Ayoib (2001) using 
the Malaysian listed Bursa annual report for companies from 1993-1995 reported positive and significant 
association. However, Basioudis and Fifi (2004) though returned a positive and significant relationship with 
respect to clients’ size and complexity (using the total number of consolidated subsidiaries) but on the contrary 
also reported a negative but significant influence of auditee risk using debt ratio as a proxy.  
On the financial scene, Rohami et al. (2007) while studying the relationship between non-audit fees and audit 
fees controlled for auditee size and complexity and was reported to have also positively and statistically 
significant. Similarly, Akinpelu et al. (2013) conducted a cross-sectional analysis of 13 Nigerian banks for 2009 
financial year. They reported positive and significant influence of auditee size, current saving deposits account 
ratio (use to proxy risk) and the number of consolidated subsidiaries while also having to cope with a negative 
and non-significant impact on the audit fee. 
 
3. Materials and Methods 
This section describes the sample selection procedure, data sources, model specification and the estimation 
techniques adopted in this study. 
3.1 Sample and Data sources  
The sample size for this study is made up of ten (10) publicly quoted commercial banks, whose shares are listed 
and traded on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) as at 31st December, 2012. These banks, according to the 
Afrinvest Reports on Banks in Nigeria for 2013, account for over 70% of the industry total asset. Furthermore, 
the required data, which comprises of audit fees and other bank specific information, which is panel in nature, is 
gathered through content analysis of the annual reports and accounts of these selected banks.    
3.2 Model Specification and Variable Measurement 
The model for this study is based on the standard Simunic (1980) audit fee model and as modified by Fields et 
al. (2004). The modification involves the incorporation of bank-related variables, especially, of risks and 
complexities. This is also consistent with the existing literature relevant to this study coupled with their usage by 
regulatory government agencies. The model is as stated below: 
LogAFit = b1 + Logb2GEit + b3CARit + b4NPLRit + b5SUBSit + b6BRHSit + eit ……..…….………….. (1)  
The measurement of variables as captured in the above model is explained as follows: 
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Dependent Variable: 
Audit fees   LogAF   Natural log of the total audit fees 
Independent Variables: 
Variables   Symbol  Measurement     
  Apriori signs  
Gross earnings  LogGE   Natural log of the total gross earnings   + 
Capital risk  CAR   Adjusted capital/ Risk weighted assets   + 
Credit risk  NPLR  Non-performing loans/ Total loans & advances  + 
Total subsidiaries SUBS  Total number of consolidated subsidiaries   + 
Total branches  BRHS  Total number of branches     
 + 
eit = Error term (assumed to be independent and identically distributed (iid) across banks and over time) 
b2-b6 = Regression coefficients 
3.3 Data Analyses Techniques and Procedures 
The ordinary least square (OLS) panel regression is the estimating technique adopted in this study. Initially, 
equation (1) above assumes a simplest approach by running a pooled regression. However, in order to account 
for the deficiency of oversimplification and overcome the associated highly restricted assumptions of the pooled 
regression, the fixed and the random effects OLS estimation is conducted. The fixed effect model of equation (1) 
is stated as: 
LogAFit = b1i + Logb2GE2it + b3CAR3it + b4NPLR4it + b5SUBS5it+b6BRHS6it+eit ………………….… (2) 
Where b1i is assumed to be fixed; The fixed (within group) effect is adopted for this study.  
Lastly, for the random effects, the Mundlak (1978) model of estimating panel data is adopted. By so doing, a 
disturbance term is introduced. Instead of treating b1i in equation (2) as fixed, it is assume to be a random 
variable with an average value of b1 (removing the subscript, i). Therefore, the intercept value for each bank is 
expressed as: 
b1i = b1 + εi ………………….…………………………………………………………...………….…. (3) 
Where εi is a random error term with a mean value of zero and variance of σ2ε.      
By implication, the ten sampled banks are rather drawing from a much larger universe and that they have a 
common mean value for the intercept (=b1) and the individual differences in the intercept values of each bank are 
reflected in the error term, εi. Hence, equation (2) is then written as:    
LogAFit = b1 + Logb2GE2it + b3CAR3it + b4NPLR4it + b5SUBS5it + b6BRHS6it + εi + eit…………….... (4) 
Equation (4) then becomes the random effects model, rewritten as: 
LogAFit = b1 + Logb2GE2it + b3CAR3it + b4NPLR4it + b5SUBS5it + b6BRHS6it + ηit ………………..... (5) 
Where ηit = εi + eit , that is, the component error term. 
While the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test is computed to compare estimates of the pooled 
regression and the random effects, the hausman test of effects comparison is then used to choose between the 
fixed and the random effects regression models. 
 
4. Results and Discussion of Findings 
This section is divided into descriptive (which presents the summary statistics), the correlation matrix table and 
the multivariate results (which presents the results for the regression). A discussion of findings is done under 
each sub-heads.  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 (see appendix) shows the summary of the descriptive statistics for all the variables in the model. It can 
be seen from the table that there are considerable differences in the auditee-specific attributes adopted for this 
study. The mean audit fee paid by banks was N140.681million with a standard deviation of 55.236 points, the 
maximum amount being N252million and the minimum is N30million. The average gross earnings reported by 
banks over these periods were N133, 312.10billion with a minimum of N48, 934billion and a maximum of 
N360, 345billion. Similarly, the average capital adequacy ratio is 25% (approx.), the maximum being 44%, 
while the minimum is 14%. This translates to the fact that all the selected commercial banks used for this study 
met the CBN 10% capital adequacy hurdle ratio up to year 2011. The CAR is 15% from year 2012. Still, all 
these banks met this requirement as none of them reported a figure that is less than 15% for 2012 financial year.  
Furthermore, only 8% (approx.) on average, of the total loans and advances lent out were non-performing with a 
maximum and minimum of 0.10% and 22.91% respectively. While the average number of subsidiaries 
consolidated into the holding companies’ accounts over the 4-year period was 10 with a minimum of 5 and 
maximum of 26, branches of these banks has an average of 305, the maximum being 711 with a minimum of 91.         
4.2 Correlation results 
The pearson correlation matrix for all the variables is as computed and shown in table 3 (see appendix). From the 
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table, it is evidenced that none of the variables exhibited significant correlation to warrant exclusion before the 
OLS estimation is done. This procedure is for the purpose of detecting any multicollinearity problem which may 
affect the estimation.    
4.3 Multivariate Results 
The results for the regression estimates are presented in tables 4a, 4b and 4c (see appendix) for the pooled, fixed 
effects (within group) and the random effects (GLS) respectively. Before any attempt at any interpretation to 
allow for further discussion of results and findings, it is pertinent to determine which of the regression estimates 
does this study hinges upon. To this end, a comparison is made, first between the pooled and the random effects 
(GLS) regression estimates on one hand, using the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test; and between 
the fixed effects (within group) and the random effects (GLS) regression estimates on another hand, using the 
hausman fixed test.        
Pooled versus Random (GLS) effects: The results for the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test is 
presented as table 5a (see appendix). The table shows that the result of the L-M test for random effects is 
insignificant with chi-square value of 1.60 and a p-value of 0.21 (approx.), higher than 0.05 or 0.01 benchmark. 
The null hypothesis is therefore not rejected; hence the pooled estimation is appropriate.     
Fixed effects (within group) versus the random effects (GLS) regression estimates: The hausman fixed test 
results is also presented as table 5b (see appendix). This test examines if the individual effects are uncorrelated 
with the other regressors in the model. With the results as shown in the table, it can be deduced that the 
regressors are slightly uncorrelated with the ui making the random effect estimator to be consistent and efficient 
over the fixed effect. Hence, the fixed effect is of no relevance in this study. Conclusively, it is evident that 
neither fixed nor random effect is evidenced in this study. Hence, the pooled constant regression estimates is 
considered appropriate and is the estimator upon which this study is based. This conclusion seems not surprising 
especially as it concerns the banking industry, where all firms therein are subject to virtually the same issues and 
would tend to react similarly. This homogeneity tendency is further amplified as banks in the industry are largely 
regulated by the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
From table 4a, of the three coefficient estimates which carry the expected apriori expectations, only bank size 
(proxied with gross earnings) is statistically significant accounting for approximately 63% of variations in the 
bank audit fees. This is largely consistent with previous studies in both developed (Fields et al. (2004) and 
Swanson (2008)) and developing countries (Rohami et al. (2007) and Akinpelu et al. (2013)), irrespective of the 
industry and sectoral classification. The capital adequacy ratio and the number of consolidated subsidiaries are 
statistically insignificant. This implies that bank auditors do not price capital risk. This is consistent with the 
work of Fields et al. (2004) save for the status of insignificancy shown in this study and contrary to the study of 
Akinpelu et al. (2013) which reported a negative and a non significant estimates. Another inconsistency is with 
the non performing loan ratio which is negative and non significant unlike Fields et al. (2004) and Akinpelu et 
al. (2013) where both are positive, but while the former is significant, the latter is insignificant.       
Lastly is the number of branches used to proxy bank complexity. This is negative and also statistically 
significant. This is a pointer to the fact that returns rendered through electronic means from branches to their 
head offices are rather considered adequate and valid for bank auditors, thereby reducing long travels by them. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines specific client attributes capable of influencing audit fees of top 10 quoted banks in Nigeria. 
From the estimates, the bank size is found to be an overriding factor that is priced by bank auditors. This 
suggests that industrial or sectoral classifications seem irrelevant when it comes to bank size as a determinant of 
audit fees, both in developing and developed economies. In addition, the number of branches, used to proxy bank 
complexities, seen to have displayed a negative and statistically significant influence could suggest the impact of 
Information Technology (IT) largely deployed in the industry for the filing of returns by branches of these banks 
to their head offices and even by these banks to the CBN on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual 
basis. 
Lastly, since banks in Nigeria now prepare their annual reports and accounts using the newly adopted 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), though effective from 2012, with 2011 also done as a basis 
for comparison, it is the considered opinion of the authors that future research on this area should include IFRS 
bank specific variables, especially, risk exposure measures, in addition to other variables not covered in this 
study. The concentration of bank nowadays tends to be predominantly on risk management, especially, market 
risk. 
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Appendix: Schedules of tables for the study 
Table 2: Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean Min Max. Std. Dev. 
Audit fees N'm N140.681 N30 N252 55.236 
Gross Earnings N'b N133,312 N48,934 N360,34 72,087.93 
Cap. Adequacy Ratio % 24.62 13.90 43.78 7.50 
Non-Perf. Loan Ratio % 7.63 0.10 22.91 5.64 
Subsidiaries 10.33 5 26 4.28 
Branches 305.7 91 711 201.47 
Source: Stata output of data inputed by the authors 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variables LOGAF LOGGE CAR NPLR SUBS BRHS 
LOGAF 1      
LOGGE 0.4954 1     
CAR -0.0597 -0.4503 1    
NPLR -0.2400 0.0038 -0.3384 1   
SUBS 0.3172 0.5861 -0.2829 -0.1323 1  
BRHS 0.1636 0.7989 -0.4279 -0.0551 0.7109 1 
Source: Stata output of data inputed by the authors 
 
Table 4a: Pooled Regression Estimates 
Dep.Var.: LOGAF coefficient standard error t-statistics 
LOGGE 0.6251 0.2137 2.93** 
CAR 0.0022 0.0158 0.14 
NPLR -0.0133 0.0128 1.04 
SUBS 0.0175 0.0163 1.08 
BRHS -0.0012 0.0005 2.20* 
Const. -2.0906 2.4924 0.84 
Source: Stata output of data inputed by the authors. 
*sig @ 5%; **sig @ 10% 
R2= 0.5238; Adj. R2=0.3074; Prob>F=0.1031; F(5, 11)=2.42 
 
Table 4b: Fixed Effects (within) Regression Estimates 
Dep.Var.: LOGAF coefficient standard error t-statistics 
LOGGE -0.4940 0.9212 -0.54 
CAR -0.0181 0.0351 -0.05 
NPLR -0.0119 0.0207 -0.57 
SUBS -0.0013 0.0516 -0.02 
BRHS 0.0027 0.0043 0.64 
Const. 10.0391 9.5927 1.05 
Source: Stata output of data inputed by the authors. 
R2: within= 0.2021; between=0.0005; overall=0.0004;  
Prob>F=0.9450; Corr(u_i, xb)=-0.8535; F(5, 4)=0.20 
 
Table 4c: Random Effects (GLS Regression) Estimates 
Dep.Var.: LOGAF coefficient standard error z-statistics 
LOGGE 0.5546 0.2670 2.08* 
CAR 0.0011 0.0169 0.07 
NPLR -0.0116 0.0131 -0.88 
SUBS 0.0131 0.0197 0.67 
BRHS -0.0010 0.0007 -1.45 
Const. -1.2474 3.1056 0.40 
Source: Stata output of data inputed by the authors. 
*sig. @ 5%  
R2: within= 0.0318; between=0.7345; overall=0.5224; Wald chi2 (5) = 6.70  
Prob>chi2=0.2437; Corr(u_i, x)=0 (asumed); F(5, 4)=0.20 
 
Table 5a:  Estimated results of L-M test for random effects  
Estimated results Var Sd= sqrt (var) 
LOGAF 0.0827 0.2875 
E 0.0567 0.2380 
U 0.0233 0.1525 
Source: stata output 
Test: var (u) = 0; Chi2 (1) = 1.60; Prob>chi2=0.2060 
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Table 5b:  The hausman fixed test results 
Variables      Coefficients 
(b)                      (B) 
       Difference 
         (b-B) 
Sqrt (diag(v_b-v_B)) 
             S.E 
LOGGE -0.4940         0.5546 -1.0486 0.8816 
CAR -0.0018         0.0011 -0.0030 0.0308 
NPLR -0.0119        -0.0116 -0.0004 0.0161 
SUBS -0.0013         0.0131 -0.0144 0.0477 
BRHS 0.0027         -0.0010 0.0038 0.0042 
Source: stata output 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficient not systematic 
Chi2 (5) = (b-B)’ ((v_b-v_B)^(-1)) = 3.14; Prob>chi2 = 0.6785 
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